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 Geir B. Asheim * 
Ethical preferences 
in the presence of  resource 
constraints 
The interest in the concept of a sustainable 
development arises from a concern that natu- 
ral and environmental resources may not be 
managed  in a manner that secures the well- 
being of future generations.  By  letting each 
generation's  capital  and  resource  manage- 
ment be made according to its subjectivepre- 
ferences and by assuming that each generation 
through these subjective preferences exhibits 
altruism for its descendants, then this issue 
translates  into a  concern  that  the  altruism 
may not be sufficient to secure the well-being 
of future generations. 
An example where these concerns are well- 
founded is constructed by letting the subjec- 
tive preferences of each generation t be repre- 
sented by  - 
wt = u,+ bwt+,  = C  6'-'u,,  0 < b<  1 
Here the subjective welfare of generation t (  w) 
depends on its own utility (u)  and the sub- 
jective welfare of its immediate descendents. 
The utility of generation tis assumed to be an 
unquestionable  indicator  of the well-being 
that is generated from the situation in which 
it lives. Due to its recursive form these sub- 
jective preferences are equivalent to discoun- 
ted utilitarianism. The fact that the utility dis- 
count factor (6) is smaller than 1 means that 
future utility  is  discounted. There is  a two- 
fold  justification  for these subjective prefe- 
rences: (1) They are consistent with the ob- 
servation that parents care for the welfare of 
their children. (2)  They are consistent with an 
objective function that is very commonly ap- 
plied  and for which  Koopmans  (1960) has 
provided an axiomatic foundation. 
It is  not hard to construct economic mo- 
dels where discounted utilitarianism leads to 
ethically unacceptable results due to the pre- 
sence of resource constraints. The most well- 
known such example is  the Dasgupta-Heal- 
Solow (D-H-S) model of capital accumulati- 
on and resource depletion (Dasgupta & Heal 
(1974; 1979, Ch. 10) and Solow (1974)). In 
the  simple  version  that  will  be  considered 
here, it is a model with non-overlapping ge- 
nerations of constant size and no technologi- 
cal progress. A stock of reproducible  capital 
and a flow of resource extraction enters a pro- 
duction  function.  Production  is  split  into 
consumption (c)  and capital  accumulation. 









pital make up for a diminishing flow of re- 
source extraction. Let utility depend on con- 
sumption: ut  = u(Q. I will assume that u(=)  is 
strictly increasing, strictly concave and boun- 
ded above, as illustrated by Figure 1  .'The  up- 
per  bound  on utility  values  will  be  called 
'bliss'. Under these assumptions, if the sub- 
jective  preferences  are  represented  by  w, = 
+  then consumption is forced to ap- 
proach zero as time goes to infinity. This ma- 
nifestly unjust outcome is obtained no matter 
how small the discounting is, i.e.,  no matter 
how close the discount factor b is  to 1. Any 
constant discounting of the  future leads to 
the same qualitative result. The optimal utili- 
ty  path  according  to  discounted  utilitaria- 
nism is illustrated in Figure 2a. 
Ethical preferences 
In  order to achieve  an ethically  acceptable 
cost of utility msfer  from the present to the  future  outcome in the D-H-S model, ethi~al~refe- 
renccs need to be introduced. The termino- 
logy, 'ethical' vs 'subjective' preferences is ta-  -. 
ken from Harsanyi (1955).-While the term 
subjective preferences' is here meant to cap- 
I  ture 'selfish'  altruism -  in the sense that a ge- 
neration  is  motivated  to  contribute to the 
No production  is  feasible  without  resource 
extraction, while total resource extraction  is 
constrained by the availability of a finite stock 
since the resource is assumed to be non-rene- 
wable. However, with positive initial stocks of 
capital  and resource,  positive  and  constant 
consumption is feasible.' This is achieved by 
having an increased stock of reproducible ca- 
welfare of its children because it leads to in- 
creased welfare of the contributor -  the term 
'ethical preferences' is meant to capture prefe- 
rences  which  are  costly  to  abide  by  and 
which, as a consequence, will not be accepted 
unless they are imposed as a moral obligation. 
Harsanyi (1  953) and Rawls (1  971)3  argue 
that ethical preferences on intergenerational 
1.  This holds in continuous time if the stock of capital and the flow of resource extraction  enter into a Cobb- 
Douglas aggregate production function where the factor elasticity of the capital stock exceeds the factor elastici- 
ty of the resource flow.  In the present discussion of the D-H-S model, I assume that the model has the same 
properties as in continuous time with such a Cobb-Douglas function.  For an analysis of the D-H-S model in 
discrete time, see Dasgupta &  Mitra (1983). For a general analysis of the feasibility of positive and constant con- 
sumption despite a resource constraint, see Cass & Mitra (1991). 
2.  The assumption that u(*)  is bounded above is needed for the Chichilnisky and Ramsey criteria considered later. 
3.  Due to the influence of Rawls' (1  971) A Theory ofJwtice, also on questions of intergenerational justice, I will re- 
late much of my discussion to his book. Ethical  references in the ~resence  of resource constraints  57 
distributions should stem from principles of  that of personal welfares generated in them 
justice that generations would agree on in the  ... ., I will assume that w,  is interpersonal- 
original position. Moreover, Rawls (1971: 4)  ly level comparable. 
supports  the  view  that  ethical  preferences  The ethical preferences may be defined on 
should be evaluated by their implications in  the flow of utilities: (u,, u,,  u,,  ... ). I will 
specific economic  environments by  posing  assume that u, is interpersonally level and 
the question: Are  the distributional  conse-  unit comparable. 
quences acceptable given  our moral  intuiti- 
on~?~  This is in line with his concept of a re- 
flective equilibrium. 
Based on Rawls'  (1971) view, I will here 
evaluate different forms of ethical preferences 
by showing their implications in the D-H-S 
model. That a specific form of ethical prefe- 
rences yields ethically acceptable implications 
in  the  D-H-S  model  does  not,  of course, 
On the other hand, ethical preferences may 
differ with respect to what kind of ordering 
they yield: 
The ethical preferences may yield a com- 
plete preordering,  implying that if an in- 
tergenerational  distribution is  maximal ' 
with respect to the   reorder in^, then it is 
weakly preferred to all feasible distributi- 
mean that it is universally applicable. Howe-  ons. 
ver, since the D-H-S model is very ofien used  The ethical preferences may yield a partial 
to show that discounted utilitarianism produ-  preordering,6 allowing for  the possibility 
ces ethically unacceptable outcomes, it seems  that maximal intergenerational distributi- 
natural to subject  alternative  criteria  to the  ons may not be comparable. Intergenerati- 
same test.  onal  distributions  that  are  not maximal 
Before undertaking this exercise, it is use-  with respect to the preordering are deemed 
ful to present a taxonomy which can be  ap-  ethically unacceptable. 
plied for classifj~in~  the different forms of et-  It must be required that the ethical prefe- 
hical preferences that will be considered. On  rences do not depend on the stocks of capital 
the one hand, ethical   references may differ 
with respect to the object on which they are 
defined: 
The ethical   references may be defined on 
the  flow  of subjective welfares:  (w,, w,, 
w,, ...).  This is  in  accordance with what 
Sen  (1977) calls  welfarism: ((The general 
approach of making no use of any infor- 
mation about the social states other than 
and resource. This is especially important in a 
model (like the D-H-S model) where positive 
consumption entails depletion of a non-rene- 
wable resource. Because otherwise, any feasi- 
ble flow of utilities (or welfares) with positive 
consumption at any time can be realized by 
conditioning in a particular  way the capital 
and resource management on the remaining 
stock of the resource.'  Moreover, it must be 
4. This approach is in principle supported also by e.g. Koopmans (1967), Mishan (1977), and Dasgupta & Heal 
(1979, pp. 308-31  1). 
5.  A distribution is  muximalif there is no alternative distribution that is strictly preferred to it. 
6. A partial preordering is reflexive and transitive, but not complete. 
7.  This restriction seems to preclude that the ethical preferences at time tare endogenous in the sense of being 
dependent on the history up to time t.  Note, however, that for each of the Ramsey, Solow, Dalton, and Calvo 
criteria considered later, it is possible to express each generation's optimal capital and resource management as a 
function of its inherited stocks of  capital and resource.  This can be done even though the ethical preferences do 
not depend on stocks. 5  8  Geir B. Asheim 
required  that  generations  have  identical  perties of the utility flow is  instrumental in 
ethical  preferences. Because  otherwise,  any  securing the well-being of future generations. 
feasible flow of utilities (or welfares) can be  Therefore,  it seems interesting to pose  the 
realized  by  letting  the  preferences  change. 
This means that the ethical preferences must 
not depend on absolute time. Finally, genera- 
tions  must  perform  consistent planning in 
the sense of taking into account that the same 
ethical preferences will be applied by future 
generations. 
The Chichilnisky criterion 
Chichilnisky  (1996) has suggested a class of 
ethical  preferences  that  are  based  on  the 
axioms that neither 'the present' nor 'the fu- 
ture' should be  dictated. Ethical  preferences 
in this class are defined on (u,, u,, u,,  ... ) and 
depend both on the flow of utilities over time 
and the long-run behavior of utility values. 
Following  Beltratti,  Chichilnisky  &  Heal 
(1995), I  here consider the following repre- 
sentation (where the discount factor 6 need 
not coincide with the discount factor b of the 
subjective preferences):' 
8C6'-'uI+  (1-8) lim inf ul, 0<8<1, 0<6< I. 
t=I  r+-  tt  T 
Hence, the ethical preferences are represented 
by a weighted sum of the sum of discounted 
utilities and the level of utilities that is appro- 
ached when time goes to infinity. 
Beltratti,  Chichilnisky & Heal  (1995, p. 
149) (<...  feel that this formulation is in tune 
with the concerns of those who write about 
sustainability and our responsibilities to futu- 
re  generations.)) However, any of the future 
generations  that  such writers  have concern 
for will live in finite  time.  Hence, the Chi- 
chilnisky criterion is in tune with these con- 
cerns only if the weight on the limiting pro- 
question: What are the implications of impo- 
sing the Chichihisky criterion as ethical pre- 
ferences in the D-H-S model?  Note that Alis- 
tair Ulph in his discussion of Beltratti, Chi- 
chilnisky & Heal (1995) argues that this is an 
important exercise:  ({I would like to see the 
implications of the proposed new welfare cri- 
terion worked out in a wider class of models, 
and in particular models of the type ... invol- 
ving non-renewable resources and for which 
we know that the discounted utilitarian crite- 
rion with high utility discount rates gives un- 
palatable outcomes))  (Ulph (1995, p.  171). 
In the D-H-S model, 'bliss' can be approa- 
-  - 
ched in the limit as  time goes to infinity as 
long as there are positive stocks of capital and 
resource at any finite time. Hence, the second 
term  of the objective function representing 
the Chichilnisky criterion  is  not precluded 
from attaining its maximum value as long as 
the stocks are positive. If both stocks are not 
positive, consumption must converge to zero 
as  time goes to infinity. This means that the 
second term of the objective function works 
as an instrument for keeping stocks positive. 
Now, the program that maximizes the sum of 
discounted utilities -  i.e., the first term of the 
objective function representing the Chichil- 
nisky criterion -  implies that stocks are posi- 
tive at any finite time.  Hence, 'bliss'  can be 
approached as time goes to infinity even if the 
concern for future generations is postponed. 
Therefore, such a postponement is desirable 
according to the Chichihisky criterion since 
it does not affect the second term of the ob- 
jective function, while it allows for an increa- 
se of the first term. On the other hand, ethi- 
8.  If u, is a convergent sequence, then lim inf ut = lim u;  Note that lim inf u, is defined even if u, is not con- 
vergent. Ethical preferences in the presence of resource constraints  5  9 
cal welfare is decreased if the concern for fu- 
ture  generations  is  postponed  indefinitely 
since then  'bliss'  is  not approached as  time 
goes to infinity. The conclusion is that no op- 
timal distribution  exist^.^ 
It is  important to note that this non-exi- 
stence problem does not arise due to techni- 
cal issues of a mathematical nature. It arises 
because the limiting properties of the utility 
flow as time goes to infinity cannot be used as 
a proxy for the well-being of future generati- 
ons that live in finite time. In fact, in the D- 
H-S model a utility path that is 'nearly' opti- 
mal  according to the Chichilnisky criterion 
will be close to the utility path that is optimal 
according to discounted ~tilitarianism.'~  Bel- 
tratti, Chichilnisky & Heal's  (1995, p.  150) 
claim -  that their <<approach  is  fully consis- 
tent with earlier discussions of sustainability, 
-  is therefore puzzling. 
The Ramsey criterion -  Classical utilitari- 
anism 
Ramsey (1928) suggests to apply classical ut- 
ilitarianism  to  intertemporal  distributions. 
This means  that the ethical preferences  are 
defined on (u,, u,,  u,, ... ) and are represented 
by  m 
C  (.,-.), 
r=l 
where u is the 'bliss' utility level. Dasgupta & 
Heal (1  979, Ch. 10)  consider the Rarnsey cri- 
terion and show that an optimal utility path 
exists under given assumptions on the utility 
function. When it exists, the optimal utility 
path  is  always  increasing  and  approaches 
'bliss' as time goes to infinity. These properti- 
es of the optimal utility path -  which are cau- 
sed by the fact that investment in capital is al- 
ways productive in the D-H-S model in the 
sense of yielding a positive  net  return -  are 
illustrated in Figure 3a. 
It will prove useful  to describe  criteria in 
terms of their relation to the cost of interge- 
nerational  transfers.  Therefore,  say  that  a 
transfer of utility from one generation to anot- 
her has negative cost if the provider loses less 
utility than the receiver gains. Due to positive 
productivity of capital investments, a given sa- 
crifice of consumption can be turned into a gre- 
ater gain of consumption for the next genera- 
tion. Hence, along a path with constant con- 
sumption (so that total and marginal utility is 
constant), a given sacrifice of utility can be 
turned  into a greater gain  of utility  for  the 
next generation. In this case, there is a negati- 
ve cost 3f  utility transfer from one generation 
to the next. Note that the cost of utility trans- 
fer is related to capital productivity, growth in 
consumption, and the concavity of the utility 
function; not to incentive constraints as in the 
case of intragenerational redistribution. 
A utility path that is optimal according to 
discounted utilitarianism has a negative cost  - 
of utility transfer from one generation to the 
next  since a loss of b (<I)  for the provider 
9.  Existence may be ensured if 6 is time variant and the utility discount rate ((-d6/dt)/6) goes sufficiently fast to 
zero as time goes to infinity.  However, in such a case the second term of the objective function is not needed 
since maximization of the first term ensures that 'bliss'  is approached as time goes to infinity.  Furthermore, 
given our requirements, 6 can only depend on rckztivc time, not absolutc time.  When 6 is not time invariant, 
this in turn creates a time inconsistency problem in the sense that some generation t > 1 will not want to cont- 
inue the optimal path at time 1. Whether existence can be restored when generations plan consistently appe- 
ars to be an open question. 
10. The following is precise statement of this result.  The supremum of the Chichilnisky objective function is the 
weighted sum of the value of the path optimal according to discounted utilitarianism and the value of a path 
approaching 'bliss' as time goes to infinity. Consider for any n a path with a value according to the Chichilnis- 
ky objective function less than l/n  from the supremum.  As  n goes to infinity, this sequence of paths approa- 
ches in the topology of pointwise convergence the path that is optimal according to discounted utilitarianism. 60  Geir B. Asheim 
yields a gain of 1 for the receiver. If this was  Figure 3a 
not the case, the utility path would not be op-  The Ramsey criterion 
utility 
timal since a transfer  increasing the value of 
the objective function of discounted utilitari- 
anism would have been feasible. This obser- 
vation, which  reflects that the future is  dis- h 
counted, is illustrated by Figure 2b.  I/  I  I 
The Ramsty criterion is characterized by  the re-  time 
quirement that any feasible  utility tranger with  Figure 36 
negative cost should be undertaken.  cost of ut~lity  uansfer from the present to the future 
I 
Hence, the Ramsey optimal utility path satis- 
fies that the cost of utility transfer from one 
generation to another is zero."  Again, if this 
was not the case, the utility path would not be 
optimal since a transfer increasing the value 
of the objective function of the Ramsey crite- 
rion would have been feasible. This is illustra- 
ted by Figure 3b. 
It is sometimes claimed that Rawls (1971) 
argues against discounting the future; there 
are quotes from Rawls (1971  :45) that seem to 
support this claim: (<There  is no reason for the 
parties to give any weight to mere position in 
time.,)  However,  it  is  absolutely clear  that 
Rawls  (1971) does not support the Ramsey 
criterion. He writes the following on the use 
of classical utilitarianism in the context of in- 
tergenerational justice: 
(<  ... [I]  t seems evident ... that the classi- 
cal principle of utility leads in the wrong 
direction for questions of justice betwe- 
en generations. ... [Tlhe utilitarian doc- 
trine may direct us to demand heavy sa- 
crifices of the poor generations for the 
sake of greater advantages for later ones 
that are far better 0fff.n  Rawls (1971:44) 
Dasgupta  (1995) refers  to Mirrlees  (1967) 
and Chakravarty (1969) who showed in plau- 
sible economic models that the present gene- 
ration  would  be  asked  to  save  and  invest 
around 50 percent of GNP if the Ramsey cri- 
terion  were  imposed.  One may  argue - as 
Rawls do -  that this implication undermines 
the ethical appeal of the Rarnsey criterion. 
The Solow criterion -  Rawlsian maximin 
on utility 
Rawls (1971) does not support the use of ma- 
ximin (or the drfferenceprincipk) in the con- 
text of intergenerational justice. He  writes: 
awe  can do something for posterity, but 
it can do nothing for us. ... It is now cle- 
ar why the difference principle does not 
apply to the savings problem. There is 
-  - 
no way for later generations to improve 
the situation of the least fortunate first 
generation.* Rawls (1  971  :44) 
1 1. An earlier generation has a greater marginal utility of consumption since its consumption level is lower.  Hen- 
ce, a given change in utility corresponds to a smaller change in consumption for an earlier generation.  When 
a transfer is made from an earlier to a later generation, this difference in marginal utility is canceled out by the 
positive capital productivity.  This explains how the earlier generation's sacrifice of utility equals the later gene- 
ration's gain of utility. Ethical preferences in the presence of resource constraints  6 1 
However, Rawls (1971) does not seem to take 
into account that, if we can increase our im- 
mediate well-being by depleting natural  re- 
sources and reducing the long-term quality of 
environmental resources, then, in effect, pos- 
terior  can do something for  us.  Therefore, 
with  resource constraints  it seems right  for 
Solow (1974) to be a ... plus Rawhien que k 
Rawh by applying maximin also in the con- 
text of intergenerational justice. This means 
that the ethical preferences are defined on (u,, 
u,,  u3, ... ) and are concerned with the worst- 
off generation  in terms of utility; hence, the 
preferences are represented byI2 
inf y 
t2I 
In  the  D-H-S  model,  the  Solow  criterion 
yields a completely egalitarian utility path, as 
showed by  Solow (1974) and illustrated  in 
Figure 4a. 
The Solow criterion is characterized by  the re- 
quirement that any utility transferfiom a richer 
to a poorer generation should be undertaken, 
no matter the cost of transfer (as long as the 
cost is finite). As illustrated by Figure 4b, this 
implies that the cost of utility transfer from 
one generation  to the next  can  initially be 
quite negative, reflecting the positive and de- 
creasing productivity of capital investment. 
Solow  (1974, p.  41) notes an important 
drawback with the use of the maximin prin- 
ciple in the context of intergenerational justi- 
ce:  N...  [I]t requires an initial capital stock big 
enough to support a decent standard  of li- 
ving, else it perpetuates poverty, but it can not 
Figure 4a 




cost of ut~lity  uansfer from the present to the future 
I 
tell us why the initial capital stock should ever 
have been accumulated.,, A second problem 
can be added: If each generation has an altru- 
istic concern for its immediate descendants, 
parents  may wish  to save for the benefit  of 
their children over and beyond the level of sa- 
ving that is implied by the Solow criterion. 
Why should such additional saving be disal- 
lowed when it contributes to increased sub- 
jective welfare for both the parents and their 
children?13  For the remainder  of this paper, 
two alternative ways to overcome these pro- 
blems will be discussed. 
The Dalton criterion -  The modified 
principle of transfers 
Are there ethical preferences that produce ac- 
ceptable outcomes in the D-H-S model? In 
order  to  provide  a different  perspective on 
this problem, let us go back to a seminal con- 
12. Since there is an infinite number of generations, there may not exist a worst-off generation.  If a worst-off 
generation exists, then inf u, = min u,.  Note that inf u, is defined even if there is no worst-off generation. 
13. Roemer (1996) discusses this issue and concludes that ~[elgalitarians  should, indeed, prefer the maximin solu- 
tion to its altruistic deviationr.  Rather than arguing pro and contra this view, the purpose of the remainder of 
my paper is to show how ethical preferences can be amended so that they allow for the .altruistic  deviation.. 62  Geir B. Asheim 
tribution to the literature on inequality,  na- 
mely Dalton (1  920). He writes: 
(( ... [Ilnequality ... may be conveniently 
defined  as  the ratio of total economic 
welfare attainable under an equal distri- 
bution to the total economic welfare at- 
tained under a given distribution. ... [I]f 
... a transfer of income takes place from 
the richer to the poorer, inequality is di- 
minished.,,  Dalton  (1920, pp.  349 & 
351) 
Hence, he argues that when income is trans- 
ferred from a richer to a poorer and the trans- 
fer is  not so large that their relative positions 
are reversed,  then  a preferred  social state is 
achieved. Dalton (1920) calls this the princi- 
ple of  transfers. I will here apply this principle 
in  the context of transfers  between  genera- 
tions. Moreover, in order to relate this prin- 
ciple  to  the  other  criteria  of this  paper,  I 
choose  to  strengthen  the  principle  so  that 
transfers of utility are considered, not trans- 
fers of consumption. This modified principk 
of  transfers can be stated as follows: 
Any utility transfer with zero costfiom a richer 
to a poorer generation should be undertaken. 
Note that the Dalton criterion yields a parti- 
al preordering, deeming an intergenerational 
distributions  (u,, u,,  u,,  ... ) ethically unac- 
ceptable if there exists a feasible transfer of ut- 
ility with zero cost from a richer to a poorer 
generation. 
Since capital investments are productive in 
the D-H-S model, the Dalton criterion appli- 
ed to the D-H-S model implies that the utili- 
ty path (u,, u,,  u3, ... ) is an acceptable social 
choice only if it is non-decreasing To see this, 
assume to the contrary that one generation 
has a higher utility than the immediately suc- 
ceeding generation.  Since capital investment 
is  productive,  it  is  possible to transfer  con- 
sumption with negative cost from the earlier 
(i.e. richer) generation to the later (i.e. poorer) 
generation.  Since  the  utility  function  is  a 
strictly increasing and strictly concave functi- 
on, it is  thus possible to transfer utility with 
negative cost from the richer generation to the 
poorer  generation.  With  the  additional  as- 
sumption that there is free disposal of invest- 
ment flows,14 this means that it is possible to 
transfer utility with zero cost from the richer 
generation to the poorer generation. In fact, 
the only utility paths in the D-H-S model that 
are consistent with the Dalton criterion are 
completely egalitarian paths, and 
efficient and non-decreasing paths with a 
non-positive cost of utility transfer from 
an earlier to a later generation. 
Figure 5 illustrates the intuition behind this 
result in the case with only two generations. 
Here, the curve depicts the set of efficient ut- 
ility paths. The Ramsey optimal path (R)  ma- 
ximizes the sum of utilities. The Solow opti- 
mal path (S) is efficient and completely egali- 
tarian. The cost of utility transfer from gene- 
ration 1 to generation 2 is negative for utility 
paths on the efficient curve to the right of R 
Notice that, among the efficient utility paths 
satisfjing the  Dalton criterion, the Ramsey 
optimal path is at the one extreme having ba- 
rely non-positive cost of utility transfer, whi- 
le the Solow optimal path is  at the other ex- 
treme being barely non-decreasing 
The term sustainable development has by 
many writers been associated with non-decre- 
asing utili~y.'~  Above I have argued that the 
14. Note that an  assumption of free disposal of investment flows, in a model with environmental capital, means 
that negatively valued waste products can freely be generated, not freely be disposed off. Ethical preferences in the presence of resource constraints  63 
Dalton criterion in the context of the D-H-S 
model admits only outcomes that are consis- 
tent with this idea of sustainability. It is, ho- 
wever, important to note that the asymmetry 
in outcomes -  namely that only non-decrea- 
sing paths are compatible with the Dalton 
criterion -  does not arise because the Dalton 
criterion is asymmetric with respect to time. 
The Dalton criterion  is  perfectly  symmetric 
with respect to time. The asymmetry in out- 
comes is  caused by the positive capital pro- 
ductivity of the D-H-S model: Along a path 
with constant utility, transfers from earlier to 
later generations are less costly than transfers 
from later to earlier generations. Hence, sus- 
tainability  is  not adopted as  a primitive  as- 
sumption. Rather, it is the result of a primiti- 
ve assumption, namely, the Dalton criterion, 
that  does  not  assign  any  inherit  value  on 
making future generations better off than the 
current generation.16 In this way, the Dalton 
criterion offers a foundation for sustainabili- 
ty in technologies with positive capital pro- 
ductivity. 
Since the Dalton criterion is a partial pre- 
ordering, it causes no conflict between the et- 
hical preferences on the one hand, and the al- 
truistic concern expressed through the sub- 
jective preferences on the other hand. Gene- 
rations  may  therefore  choose  according  to 
their subjective preferences, but subject to the 
constraint that the resulting utility path satis- 
fies the Dalton criterion. This entails that the 
Figure  5 
generations consider it a moral obligation to 
choose a distribution that is acceptable given 
the  Dalton  criterion,  but that  they  may - 
within  these  bounds - maximize  their  'sel- 
fish',  but altruistic, subjective welfare as spe- 
cified in the introduction. If generations ma- 
ximize their subjective welfare subject to the 
Dalton criterion, the resulting distribution is 
nondecreasing  with  an  eventual  stationary 
phase. With a small capital stock and a large 
resource stock, this eventual phase is prece- 
ded by an initial phase with increasing utili- 
ty."  In the latter case, all generations are bet- 
ter off measured  in subjective welfare  than 
15. The idea defining sustainability in this way dates at least back to Tietenberg (1984) and seems to have been fair- 
ly widely accepted; see, e.g. Repetto (1986), Pazey (1989), and Mder (1989). A critical assessment ofthis in- 
terpretation of sustainability is given by Pearce et al. (1989, pp. 32 & 49).  Hammond (1994) gives an interes- 
ting review of references relating to the notion of sustainability. See also Solow (1993). 
16. Hence, the Dalton criterion is not subject to a critique proposed by Roemer (1996): (, ... that we value progress 
because it will make evervone in the future better off than todav. does not stand uo to analvsisr. See Bucholz  ,  . 
(1  996) for a related foundation of sustainability that is also symmetric with respect to time. 
17. These results are established in Asheim (1 991, Proposition 7). The ethical preferences in Asheim (1991, Defi- 
nition 3) differs from the Dalton criterion as specified here.  In particular, only the unmodified principle of trans- 
fers (hence, in terms of consumption) is satisfied (Lemma 2(ii)). Still, Proposition 7 applies since the optimal ut- 
ility path is efficient and non-decreasing, it maximizes subjective  welfare over all non-decreasing paths, and it has 
a negative cost of transfer from an earlier to a later generation (Asheim (1988, Proposition 2 & Lemma 4)). 64  Geir B. Asheim 
Fipre da  The Calvo criterion -  Rawlsian maximin  - 
utility 
The Dalton criterionllhe Calvo criterion  On  subjective 
Some scholars -  notably Arrow (1973), Das- 
"bliss"  gupta (1974), and Calvo (1978) -  have inter- 
preted Rawls (1971) as  promoting the view 
;hat  one should take inti account-the  dtru- 
ism of the generations when finding a just sa- 
vings principle  for intergenerational justice. 
Here are some quotes that supports this in- 
terpretation: 
Figure 66 
(c  ... [Slince it is assumed that a genera- 
tion  cares  for  its  immediate  descen- 
cost of uullty uansfer from the present to the future  dants, as father say care for their sons, ... 
time  certain limits on [a just  savings princi- 
ple]  would  be  acknowledged. ... They 
b- 1  try to piece together a just savings sche- 
dule  by  balancing  how much  at each 
stage they would be willing to save for  -  - 
their  immediate  descendants  against 
with the Solow optimal path.''  In any case,  what they would feel entitled to claim of 
the least fortunate first generation is better off  their  immediate  predecessors.,,  Rawls 
measured in subjective welfare than with the  (1971:44) 
Ramsey optimal path."  The Dalton optimal 
path is illustrated in Figure 6a. As illustrated  Calvo's (1978) suggestion is to apply Rawlsi- 
by Figure bb, the cost of utility transfer from  an maximin on the subjective welfare, which 
one generation  to the next  is negative. It is  amounts to ethical preferences that are in ac- 
equal to 6  - 1 initially if there is a phase with  cordance with welfarism. This means that the 
increasing utility, and decreasing to zero  in  ethical preferences are defined on (w,, w,,  w,, 
the eventual phase with constant utility.,O  ... ) and are concerned with the worst-off ge- 
The Dalton criterion therefore provides a  neration in terms ofsubjective welfare; hence, 
solution  to  the  problem  of finding ethical  the preferences are represented by 
preferences that yield acceptable implications 
in the D-H-S model.  inf wf 
t 21 
18. The Dalton optimal path uniquely maximizes the first generation's subjective welfare over all non-decreasing 
paths.  If the Dalton optimal path differs from the Solow optimal path, then the former must yield higher sub- 
jective welfare for the first generation than the latter, since the latter is also non-decreasing.  Since the Dalton 
optimal path yields a non-decreasing path of subjective welfares, while the Solow optimal path yields a constant 
path of subjective welfares, the result follows. 
19. The Dalton optimal path uniquely maximizes the first generation's subjective welfare over all non-decreasing 
utility paths.  Since the Dalton optimal ~ath  differs from the Ramsey optimal path and the latter is also non- 
decreasing, the result follpws. 
20. Figure 5b measures at time t the average cost, per unit time, of a marginal utility transfer from generation t to 
its descendants in all generations, given that all later generations receive an equal utility gain.  Formally, the me- 
asure is equal to a - 1, where a is defined in Asheim (1  988, p. 474). Ethical preferences in the presence of resource constraints  6  5 
Flow of utilities 
(excl. altruism) 




Complete preordering  preordering 
I  1- 
Chichilnisky 
Neither the present 
nor chc Future should 
be dictated 
If the generations  perform consistent  plan- 
ning, the Calvo criterion yields the same dis- 
tribution  as  maximizing  subjective  welfare 
subject to the Dalton ~riterion.~'  In particu- 
lar, the Rawlsian maximin principle may al- 
low for growth so that poverty is not perpetu- 
ated. Furthermore, the least fortunate first ge- 











interest. The Calvo criterion therefore resol- 
ves  the two drawbacks that were  associated 
with the Solow criterion. 
The  Calvo criterion provides an alternative 
solution  to the problem  of finding  ethical 
preferences that yield acceptable implications 
in the D-H-S model. In contrast to the other 
criteria that are  considered  here, the Calvo 
criterion is in accordance with welfarism. 
Concluding remarks 
Table 1 gives an overview of the criteria of in- 
tergenerational justice  that I have evaluated 
in the D-H-S model. The Chichilnisky crite- 
rion  fails by not yielding existence. The re- 
maining four criteria lead to non-decreasing 
consumption and thus solve the fundamental 
problem associated with discounted utilitari- 
anism  in  the D-H-S  model.  However,  one 




the Ramsey criterion is unfair to the least for- 
tunate first generation. Furthermore, the So- 
low criterion tends to perpetuate poverty and 
do not respect the altruistic concern that pa- 
rents may have for their children. Therefore, 
of the criteria considered,  only the Dalton 
and Calvo criteria remain. These two criteria 
have identical implications in the D-H-S mo- 
del, and they are not subject to any of the pro- 
blems mentioned above: 
existence  is  ensured,  and consumption is 
non-decreasing,  - 
the first generation has a strictly lower con- 
sumption than later generations only if it - 
according  to the altruistic concern of its 
subjective preferences -  chooses to let the 
next generation consume on its behalf, 
poverty need not be perpetuated if parents 
thus let children consume on their behalf, 
and, 
the  altruistic  concern  that  parents  may 
have for their children is thereby respected. 
The present paper does not address how the 
Dalton and Calvo criteria would result from 
principles of justice agreed upon by the gene- 
rations in the original position. Some remarks 
will be offered, though. 
The Calvo criterion relies on the assumpti- 
21. This result  is established in Asheim  (1988, Theorem 2). 66  Geir B. Asheim 
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